South Carolina Law Review
Volume 11

Issue 1

Article 18

Fall 1958

Public Corporations
Huger Sinkler

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sinkler, Huger (1958) "Public Corporations," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 11 : Iss. 1 , Article 18.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol11/iss1/18

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Sinkler: Public Corporations

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
HUGER SINKLER*

Zoning
Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc.1
Any question as to whether the McAlister Clan involved in
this litigation is of Scottish or Irish descent will be dispelled
by a narrative of the background of this case. Hoot mon! It
is Scottish - truly descended from the indomitable Robert
Bruce - and thoroughly imbued with his legendary determination.

2

More than twenty years ago, the Clan McAlister bought the
property on the northwest corner of Smith and Wentworth
streets, in the City of Charleston, the one-time mansion of the
Secretary of the Treasury of the Confederacy, Christopher
Gustavus Memminger, for the avowed purpose of conducting
the business of a funeral home on the property. Momeier, the
present plaintiff, and a nearby resident, objected, and the issues were thus drawn. On three earlier occasions the Supreme
Court of South Carolina has reviewed aspects of the dispute.3
On the last of these occasions, the Supreme Court made final
an order enjoining John McAlister, Inc. from conducting a funeral home or any type of funeral activity on the subject premises. One might well conclude that the decision would have
*Member of firm of Sinkler, Gibbs & Simons, Charleston; B.A., 1927,
College of Charleston; legal education, 1929, University of South Carolina; member City Council of Charleston, 1939-43; member State Legislature, 1932-36 and 1945-46; member Charleston County, South Carolina, and American Bar Associations.
1. 231 S. C. 526, 99 S. E. 2d 177 (1957).
2. Robert I, "The Bruce," King of Scotland, achieved his crown and
recognition after many adversities. Legend has him in hiding on the
Island of Rathlin, despondent over his repeated defeats in battle at the
hands of the English. Hiding out in a cave on one occasion, almost
reconciled to defeat, he watched a spider in its repeated efforts to spin
its web across the roof of the cave. Although failure after failure met
its efforts, the spider persisted, until finally it met success. Bruce regarded the incident as an omen of good fortune and decided on a further
effort - this time success rewarded him.
3. Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc., 190 S. C. 529, 3 S. E. 2d 606
(1939) - dealing with procedural aspects of a suit to enjoin the operation of the funeral home; Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc., 193 S. C. 422,
8 S. E. 2d 737 (1940), again dealing with procedural aspects of the
same suit; Momeier v. John McAlister, Inc., 203 S. C. 353, 27 S. E. 2d 504
(1943), permanently enjoining John McAlister, Inc. from operating a
funeral home on this location as violative of the City of Charleston's
zoning ordinance.
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brought about a change of heart - but not to the Clan McAlister. Thirteen years later, on July 10, 1956, they procured
an amendment to the Charleston Zoning Ordinance relating to
this property only, which now permits it to be used for a
funeral home.
In the present action the plaintiff contended that the defendant should be held in contempt because it proposed to
violate the order of injunction made final in the disposition
of the third appeal in 1943, and asked that the amendatory
ordinance be condemned as invalid spot zoning. To sustain
its judgment denying relief, and in refusing to condemn the
action of the City Council of Charleston as arbitrary, the lower
court, whose opinion became that of the Supreme Court,
pointed to many changes in conditions that had occurred in
the intervening years, noting that while the Charleston zoning
ordinance forbade doctors' offices in this area, some sixteen
doctors maintained offices therein (presumably under permits
granted by the Board of Adjustment pursuant to the justified
variance clause). It also noted that while only six businesses
existed at the time of the adoption of the zoning ordinance in
1931, now thirteen existed, varying from an egg market to
a radio station. Both on the record and in reality conditions
in this area have in fact changed. Therefore the facts of this
case justify its result, but spot zoning is an ill-advised practice, always condemned by the courts. For that reason it is
rather surprising that the Supreme Court issued a short per
curiam order, merely affirming the judgment of the lower
court and adopting it as the judgment of the Supreme Court.
The lower court had not really emphasized how unusual was
this case. Therefore the Supreme Court should have commented on those unusual features lest the decision become a
bad precedent to sanction future spot zoning.
The key statement in the lower court finding reads:
...... In my view of the matter, the action of the Council can only be, and should be upheld as a valid exercise
of its power to amend . . . [its zoning ordinance] by
reason of changed conditions and for the good of the
general welfare.
This is, of course, the only basis for upholding any action
by any municipality operating in the field of zoning amendments. But general welfare is seldom, if ever, advanced by
acting only for one individual property owner.
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The Supreme Court has itself condemned the type of spot
zoning which results from variances permitted by a board
of adjustment,4 and to illustrate the horror with which the
text writers on the general subject of zoning regard spot zoning: Yokleys refers to it as a vicious practice, as he apoplectically remarks:
However, no discussion of the amendment of zoning
ordinances or the right of the municipality to so amend
them could be undertaken intelligently without a clear
and distinct reference to a most vicious practice that has
expanded almost to a point where it has become a cancerous growth on the body politic in many, many municipalities of the land, an evil generally denominated as "spot
zoning" or "piecemeal zoning".
Rathkopf6 is only slightly milder. He says:
Spot zoning is based upon such privilege granted to
benefit an individual owner at the expense of the general
public.
Nevertheless, the case here is probably one of the rare cases
in which an ordinance of the sort challenged can be sustained
by reason of the change of conditions that had come about,
but because of the rarity of such circumstances, they.most
certainly should be emphatically so noted.
Kerr v. City of Columbia7 is once again a case in which
the property owner is given permission to convert her property to business use in the face of neighborhood protests. Mrs.
Kerr's property, on the northeast corner of North Main Street
and Hyatt Avenue, is in that part of the City of Columbia
that formerly constituted the adjacent municipality of Eau
Claire. Mrs. Kerr's property measures 100 feet on Hyatt
Avenue and 150 feet on North Main Street. Her residence
faced Hyatt Avenue.
Unable to obtain a building permit enabling her to construct
a filling station on the property from the City of Columbia
officials, she instituted this action in equity to secure relief.
Shortly prior to the annexation of Eau Claire by Columbia
in the fall of 1955, the plaintiff made what she regarded as a
routine application to the Town Council of Eau Claire for a
4.
5.
6.
7.

Hodge v. Pollock, 223 S. C. 342, 75 S. E. 2d 752 (1953).
1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 202 (2d ed. 1953).
1 RATHKOPF, LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 369 (3rd ed. 1956).
232 S. C. 405, 102 S. E. 2d 364 (1958).
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permit to construct the filling station." Her application was
premised on the fact that all of North Main Street, with exceptions not pertinent here, was zoned for business and that
accordingly she was entitled to a permit. Town Council nevertheless rejected her application "because the property faced
Hyatt Avenue which was zoned for residents [sic] .... "
Two months later Eau Claire became a part of Columbia.
Mrs. Kerr then made application to Columbia for a permit
which was refused on the ground that Columbia regarded all
newly annexed territory as residential in character. At this
point Mrs. Kerr turned to the courts for mandatory injunctive
relief. Avoiding the question as to whether the treatment of
annexed territory by the City of Columbia was valid, the Court
granted the relief sought, on the ground that the proper construction of the Eau Claire ordinance permitted the use of
the property for business purposes, since it had frontage on
North Main Street which was so zoned. The Court stated that
the Town Council of Eau Claire should have so ruled, and that
it would, as a court of equity, regard as done that which should
have been done.
If the Court had contented itself with so holding, and if it
had not seen fit to interject into its opinion a statement implying that Eau Claire was estopped from refusing to grant
the permit because some two years earlier, when Mrs. Kerr
mistakenly thought she had a lucrative filling station tenant,
the town officials had told her the zoning ordinance permitted
her to construct the filling station, this review could stop here.
But such a statement is clearly contrary to all authorities,
including Yokley 9 whose work is quoted. If statements of any
city official could have the effect of amending a zoning ordinance, very little time would elapse before there would be no
zoning ordinance at all. The writer feels certain that the
Chief Justice, for whose unusual abilities the writer has the
highest regard, but whose language is now criticized, does not
really think the "assurances" of city officials that a zoning
law had a particular meaning is any ground for granting a
property holder permission to disregard the zoning law.
8. On an earlier occasion in 1953 when Mrs. Kerr thought she had se-

cured a lucrative tenant for a filling station, she had discussed the matter

with town officials of Eau Claire and had been assured a permit would
be forthcoming.
9. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE 253 (2d ed. 1953).
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Municipalities function through their governing bodies and
it is only by the action of the governing bodies that municipalities can be bound. They differ from private corporations
which can be estopped by actions of their agents. The distinction is clearly drawn by the North Carolina Supreme Court in
10
the case of City of Raleigh v. Fisher.
That action was instituted by the City of Raleigh on August 8th, 1949, to enjoin
the defendant from conducting a commercial operation in a
residential area of Raleigh. The commercial activity had been
going on since 1938. Against a claim that the city was
estopped to enforce its ordinance, the North Carolina Supreme Court unanimously said:
In enacting and enforcing zoning regulations, a municipality acts as a governmental agency and exercises the
police power of the State. Kinney v. Sutton, 230 N. C.
404, 53 S. E. 2d 306; City of Elizabeth City v. Aydlett,
201 N. C. 602, 161 S. E. 78; State v. Roberson, 198 N. C.
70, 150 S. E. 674. The police power is that inherent and
plenary power in the state which enables it to govern,
and to prohibit things hurtful to the health, morals, safety
and welfare of society. Drysdale v. Prudden, 195 N. C.
722, 143 S. E. 530; Skinner v. Thomas, 171 N. C. 98, 87
S. E. 976. L. R. A. 1916E, 338. In the very nature of
things, the police power of the State cannot be bartered
away by contract, or lost by any other mode.
This being true, a municipality cannot be estopped to
enforce a zoning ordinance against a violator by the conduct of its officials in encouraging or permitting such
violator to violate such ordinance in times past. Leigh v.
City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 607, 83 P. 2d 644, 119 A. L. R.
1503, and cases noted in the ensuing annotation. See
these North Carolina decisions: Jenkins v. City of Henderson, 214 N. C. 244, 199 S. E. 37; State v. Finch, 177
N. C. 599, 99 S. E. 409; Bank v. Commissioners of Town
of Oxford, 119 N. C. 214, 25 S. E. 966, 34 L. t. A. 487;
State v. Bevers, 86 N. C. 588; Wallce v. Maxwell, 32 N. C.
110, 51 Am. Dec. 380; Candler v. Lunsford, 20 N. C. 542.
Undoubtedly this conclusion entails much hardship to
the defendants. Nevertheless, the law must be so written;
for a contrary decision would require an acceptance
of the paradoxical proposition that a citizen can acquire
10. 232 N. C. 629, 61 S. E. 2d 897 (1950).
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immunity to the law of his country by habitually violating such law with the consent of unfaithful public officials charged with the duty of enforcing it.
While not related to zoning, the Supreme Court of South
Carolina in 1933, in the case of Farrow v. City Council of
Charleston" has clearly held that municipal corporations in
this State may not be estopped by unauthorized actions of
their officers or agents.
The writer feels that our Court, notwithstanding the criticized passages of this opinion, would, on a proper presentation, follow the North Carolina Supreme Court and that in
the final analysis the ease here will not be regarded as an
authority for the proposition that a municipal corporation
can be estopped from enforcing a zoning ordinance because
of the action or inaction of a municipal officer.
There was nothing wrong with the basic decision here. It
is just most unfortunate that the Court saw fit to attempt to
bolster it by referring to "the many equities which exist in
favor of the respondent." In passing, may we note that somewhere along the line, some judge must heed the "many equities" of all of the other property owners whose property values depend upon unswerving enforcement of zoning laws?
Power of Mayor to Bind Municipality
City of Aiken v. South Carolina,'2 was decided on February
3rd, 1958, or exactly thirty-five days before the Court decided
the case of Kerr v. City of Columbia, reviewed at length above.
The case involves a dispute between the City of Aiken and
Tatum W. Gressette as Director of the South Carolina Retirement System and State Agent for social security coverage in
South Carolina. At issue was whether a contract between the
City of Aiken and the South Carolina Retirement System had
been lawfully amended so as to include members of the Aiken
Police DepArtment within its coverage. The original contract
had been authorized by the City Council and had been executed
for the city by the mayor. Without further authorization by
the City Council, the mayor had signed an amendment extending coverage to the police department, notwithstanding that
it had been specifically omitted from City Council's original
authorization. Of course the reason for the original exclusion
11. 169 S. C. 373, 168 S. E. 852, 87 A. L. R. 981 (1933).
12. 232 S. C.284, 101 S. E. 2d 841 (1958).
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of the police department was due to the ineligibility of policemen and firemen under federal social security coverage, a situation corrected subsequent to the execution of the original contract between Aiken and the South Carolina Retirement System, and prior to the time when the amendment was executed
by the mayor.
Thus the important question in the case was the power of
the mayor to bind the city without action by the City Council.
The Court promptly and correctly held that he had no such
power. His action in signing the amendatory provision was
therefore a nullity. Municipal corporations act and bind themselves only through the means of official actions of their
governing bodies. They are not bound by unauthorized acts
of any officials, even though the official be a mayor. Compare the result here with the statements indicating estoppel
against the City of Columbia in the Kerr case.
Basis for Recovery Against City for Taking Property for
Public PurposesWithout CondemnationProceedings
Clarke v. City of Greer'3 is disposed of when the Supreme
Court sustains a demurrer to a complaint upon the ground
that the two causes of action set forth in the complaint were
misjoined, but it correctly reviews the basis upon which a
property owner may seek redress from a municipality which,
without his permission, makes use of his land for municipal
purposes. In the year 1954, acting through its co-defendant,
a contracting firm, the City of Greer entered the plaintiff's
50-acre tract and laid sewage disposal lines through the same.
In her first cause of action, the plaintiff sought actual damages from the city because it made entry upon her lands
without compensation and over her protest, and installed sewer
lines in her property. In her second cause of action she sought
actual and punitive damages from the contractor, alleging that
it had full knowledge of the city's lack of power to make entry,
but unlawfully proceeded over plaintiff's protests. It appears
that the city had undertaken condemnation proceedings under
the statute appearing in the Code as sections 59-203 and
59-204. However, when the case came on for trial in 1955,
it was discovered that these Code sections had been repealed
prior to the institution of the condemnation proceedings. The
condemnation proceedings were then dismissed, and a second
13. 231 S. C.327, 98 S. E. 2d 751 (1957).
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proceeding instituted under the 1953 Act.14 To determine if
the causes of action were properly joined, the Court undertook
to ascertain the nature of the action against the city. The
Court said:
We have no statute authorizing a common law action
for tort against a municipality in a case of this kind.
However, Article I, Section 17 of the Constitution, which
provides that private property shall not be taken "for
public use without just compensation being first made
therefor", is self-executing, and may, without enabling
legislation, be invoked by an individual whose property
has been taken for public use.
. . . Although the city may have entered as a trespasser, it may not be ejected as an ordinary trespasser.
Having the right to take Plaintiff's property under condemnation, it may retain possession upon payment of due
compensation to her for the taking ....
The second cause of action is entirely different. It is
not based on a statute or the Constitution but is solely
a common law action in tort for an alleged trespass. The
nature and measure of damages recoverable in the two
actions are different. While punitive damages may be
recovered for wilful trespass of an individual, they are
not recoverable against a municipality.
On this basis the Court correctly concluded that the causes
of action were misjoined and that the demurrer should be sustained.
Liability of Municipalityfor Defects in Streets
Floyd v. Town of Lake City"; is a case in which a pedestrian
recovered for injuries sustained when a manhole cover, situated in a grass plot between the paved sidewalk and the roadway, turned as she stepped on it, causing her to fall and sustain personal injuries. There was circumstantial proof indieating that the manhole cover had been recently moved by an
employee of the municipality, sufficient in the opinion of the
Court to warrant the submission of the question of knowledge
to the jury. On this point the case was distinguished from the
case of Driggers v. City of Florence'0 in which no recovery
14. CODE OF LAWS

OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

1957).
15. 231 S. C. 516, 99 S. E. 2d 181 (1957).
16. 190 S. C.309, 2 S. E. 2d 790 (1939).

1952 §§ 25-161 et seq. (Supp.
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was permitted because of the failure of that plaintiff to show
that the meter box (there involved) had been opened by any
employee of Florence, or that the city had actual or implied
knowledge of the existence of the dangerous condition resulting from the open meter box. Of far greater interest in the
Floyd case is the question which arose by reason of the Lake
City ordinance which declared that "[a]ll such places as lie
between the street curbing [roadway] and the sidewalks
[are] parkways." The ordinance went on to provide that
"[ilt shall be unlawful for any person to trespass upon,
walk, ride, cross or ... stand upon or otherwise trespass on
... such parkways." On the basis of this ordinance, the city
sought to escape liability.
The Supreme Court pointed out that the city's liability arose
from the South Carolina statute17 providing that any person
who shall sustain personal injury or property damage by
reason of "a defect in any street, causeway, bridge or public
way . . . " may (if not guilty of contributory negligence)
recover from the municipality.
The Court defined the city's duty with respect to the grass
plot in this language:
..
Because its primary function is not to serve as a
place for pedestrian travel, the city is not required to

keep it, and those who walk upon it must not expect to
find it, as free of obstructions and as smooth of surface
as the sidewalk or other portion of the street that is designed for such travel. But it does not follow that the
city is immune from liability for injury caused by negligence to one who walks upon or across such an area.
The "grassplot", by its very location, invites some pedestrian travel.
It thereupon concluded:
,.

.

In furtherance of its utilitarian and ornamental

purposes, the city may fence or barricade it, and such
obstructions to pedestrian use, if properly constructed
and maintained, are not defects within the meaning of
the statute, 25 Am. Jur., Highways, Section 407, pp. 702,
703; Annotation 19 A. L. R. (2d) 1053 et seq.; but it may
not, by the mere passage of an ordinance, as in the case
at bar, declaring all such areas to be parkways and pro17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
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hibiting trespass upon them, attain immunity from liability under the statute for injury or damage caused by
its negligence.
The result here seems entirely correct. Since municipal
corporations are the creatures of the legislature, their powers
and liabilities are subject to definement by the legislature and
a liability imposed by the legislature may not be escaped
through the means of an ordinance of this sort.
Offstreet Parking Facilities as a Public Purpose of Incorporated Municipalities
In the case of Boykin v. City of Camden,18 Boykin sought
to restrain the City of Camden from condemning certain property owned by him for use as a part of a public municipally
owned and operated offstreet parking lot.
In disposing of the plaintiff's contention, the Court noted
that the Off-Street Parking Facilities Act of 195410 authorized
all municipalities of the State to acquire and operate such
facilities and that the constitutionality of this act had been
specifically upheld by the Court in the case of Sammons V.
City of Beaufort,20 which holding clearly precluded the attempt made by the plaintiff to enjoin the defendant city.
Unless it were to overrule the holding in the Sammons case,
the purpose which prompted the plaintiff to institute this action is beclouded. The Sammons case has been the subject of
2 1
an earlier review.
Sewers
The case of City of Greenville v. Greater Greenville Sewer
District2 2 is a case of very narrow impression. Its sole purpose was to obtain a statutory construction which would determine which of two municipal agencies was responsible for
the cost of installing a particular sewer line in a section of
the City of Greenville which was formerly a part of Overbrook Water and Sewer Subdistrict, but which had then recently become annexed to the City of Greenville. To really
understand the mechanics of sewage disposal in Greenville
County one has to delve through a multitude of special acts
creating a multitude of Special Purpose Districts of the sort
18. 231 S. C. 325, 98 S. E. 2d 755 (1957).
19. 48 STAT. 1771 (1954).

20. 225 S. C.490, 83 S. E. 2d 153 (1954).
21. 8 S. C. L. Q. 108 (1955).
22. 232 S. C. 472, 102 S. E. 2d 524 (1958).
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whose constitutionality was unsuccessfully challenged in Mills
Mill v. Hawkins.2 3 Suffice it to say that Greater Greenville
Sewer District was created to provide "main trunk lines" for
the disposal of sewage. The City of Greenville and the "subdistricts" utilizing the "main trunk lines" were to provide the
"laterals." The question litigated was whether the particular
sewer line was a "main trunk line" or a "lateral." The Supreme Court agreed with the county judge (who had overruled the master in equity) that the sewer lines in question
were "laterals" for whose cost the City of Greenville was responsible. The writer is in complete accord with this holding.

23. 232 S. C. 515, 103 S. E. 2d 14 (1958).
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